INTRODUCTION
It is a prevailing tradition in macroeconomics that money and credit are distinct institutions. By this tradition, in a purely monetary economy, some individuals will be liquidity-constrained-that is, they won : t always have enough money on hand to make purchases even though their marginal utility of consumption is high. It would make sense to form coalitions to overcome the presumably unnecessary restrictions imposed by money so the liquidity-constrained individuals could consume. The tradition seems to be that credit markets provide such a superior arrangement.
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Green (1987) showed that when information about states is private, credit markets are in fact imperfect in that they do not fully solve the problem; indeed, the use of credit markets for consumption-smoothing can be taken as a symptom of the existence of informational asymmetries. The point I wish to make here, at least within the technical confines of the model I use, is that credit markets are no better than currency markets at overcoming liquidity frictions when there is private information. Money is in fact not a second rate asset.
I demonstrate this equivalence with two modifications of Green's contract-building approach. The first modification is to relax the assumption that the principal and agent discount the future at the same rate.
The second modification is to require aggregate resource feasibility. I find that a resource-feasible contract that attains the efficiency imputed to the existence of credit is equivalent to both credit and currency equilibria. Not only are currency and credit equivalent, then, but both can attain the efficiency frontier when all the constraints facing an economy are accounted for; those constraints must express the fact that information is private. The contract approach highlights the fact that currency and credit equilibria are Because currency and credit are insurance mechanisms, the intuition that has arisen from studying insurance with private information can be applied. The insurance within my particular model is incomplete, except in special cases I characterize. The efficiency frontier attainable by currency and credit equilibria therefore also reflects incomplete insurance. As with static insurance with private information, it is also the case that an equilibrium might not even exist; there may be adverse selection. It is not just the privacy of information that causes this adverse selection, but the joint effect of private information and resource feasibility.
I obtain these findings using a modified version of Lucas's (1980) model in which the desire for insurance arises from taste shocks rather than income shocks as in Green's approach. The taste shocks are stochastic and are the marginal utility of consumption in each period. I think of this as corresponding to actual hunger or need for services like medical care that arise randomly. Although in the simple setting here the framework is not very realistic looking, it has the advantage of relative technical transparency, so that the intuition of the findings is accessible, and it can potentially be expanded to be more realistic. Moreover, it forms a new class of dynamic programming problems in which the value function has a closed form solution. Although the boundedness assumption common in abstract infinite horizon models is not met here, I show that the dynamic programming approach of such models carries over. Feasibility and incentive compatibility can be imposed in a way that even has geometric intuition, because wealth effects are intrinsically decoupled from substitution effects.
In order to show that money and credit act like an optimal contract, I must first produce an optimal contract. I do not solve the problem of a planner maximizing the welfare of a collection of agents; instead I solve the problem of a principal maximizing profit subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility.
The principal's strategy will be to maximize discounted profit, and that profit may be positive or negative depending on the discount factor available to him. This is the same strategy used by Green, except Green assumed equality between the discount factor of individuals and that of the principal.
A second condition can then be imposed: zero profit. Rather than impose zero profit as a constraint. I ask what parameter values ensure zero profit. Having zero profit is equivalent to having a mechanism that uses exactly the resources available to the economy, a prerequisite of efficient mechanisms.
The zero profit condition is equivalent to having competitive firms provide insurance in the manner of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . However, there are many equilibria that are both incentive compatible and have zero profit. The optimal equilibrium is that whose parameter values maximize the welfare-ex ante expected discounted utility-of the representative agent. Whether this optimal equilibrium is the optimal mechanism as well must be shown by a uniqueness argument. I show this by asking what happens if the optimal equilibrium is transcended by decreasing a parameter-the discount factor of the principal -below its threshold, finding that a feasible equilibrium cannot exist there. By also showing that any mechanism that is feasible and incentive compatible cannot surpass the welfare of the corresponding zero-profit equilibrium, I have shown optimality.
The behavior of consumption at this optimum is different from that in suboptimal equilibria: it isnonstationary, a property that emerges in other models as well: Green (1987) , Atkeson and Lucas (1992) , Thomas and Worrall (1990) , and Taub (1990) continually contributing their contractual shares. Viewing asset equilibria as expressions of such contracts, the quantity constraints that are essential elements of the equilibrium-borrowing constraints and cash in advance constraints-are not supported by prices. There must be some other force that decentralizes these quantity constraints, and the threat of defection provides this force.
I consider permanent reversion to autarky because it would be the result of a grim trigger strategy in a principal versus agent game, and as such defines the maximal set of equilibria that are immune to punishment strategies. The surviving equilibria obey a folk theorem, but one in which the discount factor of the agents must decrease, rather than rise, to maintain cooperation. The result is that equilibria that obey the three properties of incentive compatibility, feasibility, and immunity from defection are a strict subset of those that obey only the first two properties, and these equilibria are stationary.
This last fact in my view justifies studying asset equilibria that are inefficient. The borrowing constraints must somehow be sustained without the equivalent of a principal, and with noncooperati ve play by the agents.
Defection translates into reneging in an asset equilibrium; the folk theorem states that equilibria exist that prevent such reneging. I in every period. Judd (1985) shows that it is valid to assume this. Lucas and Stokey (1984) ; see also Stokey and Lucas (1989) Using this information, the grandparents' maximum problem can now be restated in these terms:
maxjy -(1 -F{9* )fj + aF(9*)W(7) + a(l -F{B*))W{V)} For notational convenience, I now define the quantities 3>(0*) = //, 9dF(9) and £(9*) = F{9*)9* + $(#*). (The notation £ is purposely meant to evoke statistical expectation: if F is Bernoulli, and 9* is between the two realizations, then S = E(9).) In matrix form the two constraints then take the form y\ _/*(<?*) 0F{6*)\
The problem of finding the optimal threshold value of 9* can be considered separately from that of finding the optimal functions 7 and V . Because the family reverts to V_ with probability (1 -F($*)), the set of states value states is discrete and is described by restating (5.8) as a difference equation:
where I define the growth coefficient, py by p = 0*/p£(0*). (6.2) Observe that < p < (3~l and is a nondecreasing function of 9* The need states will have a distribution, #, with probabilities pk-Associated with each state is a consumption level, 7*. From equation (5.9),
The probabilities pk of state Vk are yk = (l-F(9*))F(9*) k , fe = 0,.... (6.4) That is, a family is desperate and reverts to state zero with probability (1 -F(0*)) regardless of its present state, obtaining value V_. Subsequent nondesperation occurs regardless of state with probability F{9* ) with the value state V* rising to Vk+i. thus there is a long run probability F(9*)(l -F(9*)) of the family being in state 1, F{9*)
The solution of the difference equation for V k is The probability of >t is the probability of state V k -\ times the probability of desperation: 
( 6.7) fc=i fc=i
The conditions needed for convergence are aF(0*)<l. aF{9*)p<l.
The following proposition shows that these conditions are generically satisfied.
If F is nonatomic, I > a > 3 are sufficient conditions for the fixed point of the dynamic programming problem. W, to be the value of the grandparents' problem. PROOF: From the first order condition for $*, (5.10), the optimal value of 9* is such that pa = 1. and since a < 1, convergence of (6.7) is guaranteed if F(9*) < 1. By proposition 5.1, 9* < 6 and hence F{9*) < 1. The affine solution to the grandparents* dynamic programming recursion is therefore defined. The hypothesis a > 3 satisfies the growth condition in lemma CI, and by proposition C.2, the solution of the dynamic programming problem is therefore the value function. » The intuition of the proof is that the conditions of the proposition provide a bound on the growth rate of the family's value state, and this growth rate is dominated by the discounting of the grandparents.
7. THE ZERO-PROFIT FRONTIER A social insurance contract would begin with families in a common state, maximizing the expected utility of a representative family, subject to revelation and to feasibility. The grandparents so far have induced revelation. I now impose feasibility as well, the equivalent of requiring zero profit in Rothschild and Stiglitzs (1976) analysis of static insurance markets. Each value of a, the discount factor of the grandparents, is associated with a zero-profit equilibrium, and endogenously fixes a minimum value state, V_, a parameter that has up until now been exogenous.
The reason for focusing attention on zero profit equilibria is that they have the potential to be equivalent to optimal mechanisms. In a partial equilibrium setting this would be immediate, but a more formal demonstration is needed here.
One could contemplate optimal contracts directly, as Atkeson and Lucas (1990) One can look at the boundary of this set; the boundary will be the set of efficient contracts. Second, the discounting of the grandparents turns out to have a direct and appealing connection to interest rates in equilibrium. One can map the search for an equilibrium interest rate into the search for a discount factor. Since grandparent contracts exist for many discount factors, the search for the "correct" discount factor that corresponds to an equilibrium can be deferred to a later stage of analysis.
A feasible program uses no outside resources: E{i) < y.
Since there is no satiation here, it is relevant to focus on contracts in which there is no waste of resources so that equality holds. Calculating the expectation, the condition is 
To calculate this value, substitute for V_ from the zero-profit condition (7.2), yielding PROOF: The condition pF{9*) < 1 is necessary for the convergence of (7.1). Combined with the first order condition pa = 1 from (5.10) and (6.2), this puts an upper bound on F{9*):
a=l/p>F(F). Lucas's (1980) equation (11) and to equation (17) in Taub (1988) Vn=*n-*"-i = F{3A B ) n ' n \\ -F(0A B )) (8.17) which is identical to the probability in (6.3). Substituting in the zero aggregate debt equilibrium condition (8.13) from (8.17) and (8.5) The proposition shows that relaxing the borrowing constraint is associated with increasing interest rates.
It also shows that the equilibrium interest rate must be below the inverse of the subjective discount factor. This finding agrees with other work on heterogeneous-agent asset equilibria; recent examples include Clarida (1990) and Huggett (1991 Readers may find the argument easier to follow by temporarily disregarding the incentive constraints. PROOF: By lemma 9.3, the threshold value of 9 is identical in the contract and the credit equilibrium.
Therefore the consumption policy functions for the contract (5.9) and the credit equilibrium (8.7-8) are identical.
Solve the zero-profit condition (7.2) to yield
The right hand side is identical to the right hand side of the credit equilibrium condition (8.14 Substituting the consumption policy function from (10.6), the market clearing condition (10.11) is ( \rM\dV{M)dF{e) = (1 -F(9*))r f McNf(M) = y (10.10) that is, the fraction of the population that is desperate, (1 -F($*)), consumes available depreciated real balances due to the cash in advance constraint: average consumption must equal the average endowment. Substituting the optimal policy functions of (10.6-7) into the transition rule for the distribution^of real balances in (10.13) yields * t+1 (M') = F(P)* t (r-\M' -y)) + l-F{P) (10.22) The first terra F(0*), is the probability of nondesperation. 
(g(d) + h(9))dF(e)<yi-rM, (11.2) g($)<rM, (11.3) g{0)>o, (11.4) h{0)>0, (11.5) PROOF: In the problem (11.1-5) H<rM, (11.13) 7i>0. (11) (12) (13) (14) Mi>0. (11.15) Using the solution of the Euler equation for 9* , (5.10), this problem is by lemma 11.1 identical to that of (10.1-5). (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986 Rothschild and Stiglitz's model). The population has two types: fraction A is desperate in the current period and nondesperate later, and vice versa for the second type which comprises 1 -A of the population.
It is obviously efficient to separate these groups and give all endowment to the currently desperate families in return for their promise to give their endowment to the opposite group in the second period. If a budget line with fair odds, that is of slope -A/(l -A), is offered to all families, the currently desperate families will consume W/X and the currently nondesperate families will consume nothing in the current period and W/{\ -A) in the second period, as shown in the figure: c '* wAI-X) desperate w/X
FIGURE 1
The slopes (marginal rates of substitution) of the indifference curves are -0/(30 in the case of the currently desperate, and -0/30 in the case of the currently nondesperate. As long as they bracket the slope of the feasible budget ( Marimon and Marcet (1992) .
I analyze only the case in which reversion to autarky takes place after the contract is executed in the current period. PROOF: Since < 1, lim a _^i S{9*) > E{9). Using the Euler condition (6.10) The results of this section are in agreement with those of Haller (1989) who examines a two-person repeated game with an insurance aspect; the results are also in agreement with the more general finding that dynamically consistent asset equilibria seem to require low or negative rates of return, such as in Atkeson (1991) , Manuelli (1985) , and Kehoe and Levine (1990 Adding the two conditions yields (*-»)( 7 (*)-7(«))>0.
Since > s, (7(0) -7(5)) > 0.
(ii) Using the result from (i), (A.2) can be written A4 -5) which proves the result. PROOF: Substitute V_ into (A. 1-2). Then in order for both inequalities to be satisfied, symmetry requires that both constraints hold with equality, and the result follows.
Proposition A.4 If s e A so that 7(3, V)=0 and e B so that V'{0, V) = V J then s < 0.
PROOF: All incentive constraints must hold with equality within the sets A and B due to symmetry.
The remaining incentive constraints take the form <hfrV) + 0V>pV'(s,V),
The right hand side of (A.7) is identical to the left hand side of (A.8) Proposition A. 6 There is a single 9* dividing the sets A and B, so Au B = [9, 9] . PROOF: Suppose the contrary, so that there is a set X such that both 7* > and V x > V_. The upper bound of the set A is s*, and the lower bound of set B is t*, so that by monotonicity, 3* < t* . Again by monotonicity, < 7 (x, V) < j(t, V) and V < V'{x, V) < V'(a, V).
The incentive constraints must hold at s*, the lower bound of X and the upper bound of A:
PV>s*~fx +f3Vx >0V
and therefore all hold with equality. Also, 0V > s*y + (3V.
The incentive constraints must also hold at t*, the upper bound of X and the lower bound of A:
Since t* > s*, both inequalities are strict. For notational convenience, I now define the quantities $(0*) = /£ 9dF(9) and €(9*) = F(9*)9* + *(0*).
(The notation £ is purposely meant to evoke statistical expectation: if F is Bernoulli, and 9* is between the two realizations, then S = E{0).) In matrix form the two constraints then take the form Because they are affine in the family's current value state, V, these solutions will be used to characterize the growth conditions that limit equilibria.
The problem of finding the optimal threshold value of 9* can be considered separately from that of finding the optimal functions 7 and V. The set of feasible choices is given by the budget constraint, the liquidity constraint and the nonnega- which is negative. Therefore, for a given n* < 0, both the left and right hand sides of (8.14) are decreasing in r, and are equal for r = 1. The derivative of the left hand side of (8.14) with respect to r at r -1 is 1 + rc*, which is negative for n* < -1. The derivative of the right hand side of (8.14) with respect to r at r = 1 is -F{f3A)/{\ -F{(3A)), which is also negative. As r approaches 1/ '(3, F(0X) -+ 1, so the right hand side of (8.14) approaches -oo, but the left hand side remains positive. The derivative of the left hand side at r = 1 can be made arbitrarily negative by decreasing n*, leaving the derivative of the right hand side unaffected. Therefore there must be some interior crossing point such that 1 < r < 1/(3 in addition to the intersection at r = 1. However at r = 1 (8.13) is undefined.
The following lemma shows that when utility is linear there is no difference between a standard stochastic dynamic programming problem in which policies are chosen in response to current realized states, with policy functions then defined by the policies over all possible realizations (as in the family's credit decisions), and one in which the current return function is an average of returns over all states and policy functions are chosen before the realization of the state (as in the grandparents' contract problem).
LEMMA E.l Let V(-, 9) be weaJdy increasing in its first argument. Define is feasible for (*). Since V* is an optimum, V* > / (9c**(9) + 3V{B'**(9),9))dF(9)= V**(9)dF(9).
{S) (i) The budget constraint in (*) is binding. If the budget constraint is not binding, increase c for some set of positive measure. This does not affect the other constraints and increases the objective, ( ii) The policy function c in (*) is monotone increasing in 9. For suppose it is not, so that c(s) = c\ > c(9) = c^, for some s < 9, and this inequality holds in neighborhoods of positive and equal F-measure around s and 9.
Then simply interchange c(s) and c(9): this does not affect the budget constraint, but increases the objective, since sc2 + 9c{ > sci + 9c2-(iii) It is suboptimal for neither of the constraints c > and B' > B_ to hold for the same 9. By increasing c and decreasing B' or vice versa, the objective can be increased.
These three steps show that it is suboptimal to violate the budget constraint for (**) for particular values of 9 while satisfying it on average (*). Averaging of the budget sets of (**) therefore does not enlarge the set of feasible policies except on sets of F-measure zero. Form a sequence of feasible policies for problem (*), including the optimal policy. V* is the supremum of averages of these policies, while E(V**) is the average of suprema. Therefore by Fatou's Lemma (Taylor, 1973, p. 121 ), V* < f V"{9)dF{9).
completing the argument. 
